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There’s a good chance that if you take an aspirin, your headache will disappear.
Then again, it might not.
Decades of clinical trials conducted with hundreds of thousands of ordinary headache
sufferers confirm that the humble aspirin really works. So, why isn’t your headache
budging? The answer, or a version of it, is usually somewhere on the package insert:
individual results may vary. The longer version of the marketing shorthand is this:
Even the best science—science characterized by rich data collected from multiple
experimental subjects or events and over multiple trials or experiments—frequently
can tell us little, if anything at all, about the individual case.
Science seeks to understand general phenomena, not particular instances. Scientists
typically don’t attempt to infer from group or population-based data (or “G”) to a
particular individual (or “i”). Answering the individual question simply isn’t part of
the everyday scientific enterprise. That’s why the applied science that is part of our
everyday lives—whether in the form of drugs, diagnostic tests, or weather forecasts—
doesn’t come with a promise. It comes with a probability.

G2i IN THE COURTS: MUDDLING THROUGH
The challenge of reasoning from group data to make
decisions about individuals—a process we call
“G2i”—is endemic in the modern courtroom. As in
everyday life, that challenge is also frequently ignored,
underestimated, or misunderstood.
Neuroscientists offer evidence that, on average,
adolescents are less developmentally mature than
adults. Cognitive psychologists testify to factors
that contribute to eyewitness misidentification.
Psychiatrists identify factors associated with “future

dangerousness.” In each case, experts offer general
statements about the empirical world based on
aggregate data across groups of individuals. The
courts, however, are typically looking for answers
specific to the case at hand: Is or was this defendant
developmentally mature? Was this eyewitness’s
identification accurate? Will this defendant be violent
in the future?
Courts are generally guided by one of two cases
when it comes to admitting—or excluding—scientific
evidence. Established in 1923, the Frye test asks
whether the scientific methods supporting the expert
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opinions are generally accepted in the particular fields
from which they come. Seventy years later, the
Supreme Court ruled that the applicable federal rules
of evidence replaced Frye test with a validity test.
Under that approach, first established in the case of
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., courts
must determine whether the methods and principles
underlying the expert opinion are reliable and valid.
Today, Daubert is the rule in all federal cases. Most
states have adopted it, as well, and many others have
been influenced by its reasoning. Neither Frye nor
Daubert, however, speak directly to G2i.
Courts are daily confronted with admissibility issues,
some of which involve the existence of the general
phenomenon (i.e., “G”) and others the question
of whether a particular case is an instance of that
general phenomenon (i.e., “i”). For instance, research
might indicate that a particular abnormality in a part
of the brain called the amygdala is associated with
psychopathy. But many psychopaths have normal
amygdalae and many non-psychopaths have abnormal
amygdalae. So although, on average, psychopaths
might have more abnormal amygdalae than nonpsychopaths, a particular person’s amygdala is not
diagnostic of psychopathy.
Unfortunately, courts have yet to carefully consider
the implications of G2i for their admissibility
decisions. In some areas, courts limit an expert’s
testimony to the general phenomenon. They insist
that whether the case at hand is an instance of that
phenomenon is exclusively a jury question, and thus
not an appropriate subject of expert opinion. In other
cases, in contrast, courts hold that expert evidence
must be provided on both the group-data issue, i.e.,
that the phenomenon exists, and what is called the
“diagnostic” issue, i.e., that this case is an instance of
that phenomenon.
Courts’ treatment of expert testimony on factors that
might lower the accuracy of eyewitness identifications
illustrates the “phenomenon only” approach. Courts
generally permit eyewitness experts to testify about
factors, such as cross-race identifications or stress,
that might negatively affect accuracy. They do not
permit testimony, however, on whether a particular
identification was accurate or not. In United States v.
Smith, for instance, the court explained that the value
of this general testimony was educative: “Educating
the jury about this research … is an important step

along the road to using improved scientific knowledge
to create more accurate and fair legal proceedings.”
The testimony was not, the Smith court emphasized,
diagnostic: “Applying this research to the facts of the
case is within the sole province of the jury.”
Yet in a host of other cases, the courts either demand
or permit experts to offer diagnostic opinions on
whether the case at hand is an instance of some
legally relevant phenomenon. In medical causation
cases, for example, a plaintiff must introduce expert
testimony on both “G” and “i”. A plaintiff claiming
that benzene exposure caused his or her leukemia,
for instance, would have to introduce both general
scientific evidence that benzene causes leukemia
and scientific diagnostic evidence that exposure
to benzene specifically caused his or her leukemia.
In cases involving forensic identification—ranging
from fingerprints to firearms—the courts generally
allow experts to testify to both “G” and “i”. Thus, a
firearms expert typically testifies that certain marks
on cartridge cases are associated with a group of
firearms and, additionally, that the marks on the
cartridge case found at the crime scene were made
by a specific gun.
Unfortunately, the cases in which the courts insist
on, or permit, diagnostic testimony do not necessarily
align with scientists’ ability to offer valid diagnostic
opinions. It is exceedingly difficult to determine
whether a particular case of leukemia is attributable to
benzene exposure, and it’s impossible to say that the
marks on a cartridge case came from a particular gun.
A key insight of G2i, then, is that courts should assess
an expert’s ability to provide empirical framework
evidence separately from his or her ability to provide
diagnostic evidence.

KNOWLEDGE AND ITS LIMITS:
THE ADOLESCENT BRAIN
Three decisions of the United States Supreme Court
illustrate both how far we have come and how far
we still have to go in understanding the limitations of
scientific inference. All three cases involved grouplevel behavioral and neuroscience research that
demonstrates that the brain, with its concomitant
developmental capacities, does not fully mature until
the early 20s.
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In Roper v. Simmons (2005), the Court held that the
Eighth Amendment did not permit imposing the death
penalty on a defendant who had killed prior to his
eighteenth birthday. Writing for the majority, Justice
Kennedy implicitly acknowledged that justice must
take into account both the validity of the “G”—the
empirical evidence that on average the adolescent is
not developmentally mature—and the difficulty of the
“i,” that is, of knowing whether a particular adolescent
is mature or not.
“[T]he differences between juvenile and adult
offenders,” Kennedy wrote, “are too marked and
well understood to risk allowing a youthful person
to receive the death penalty despite insufficient
culpability.” Drawing a line at 18 years of age, the
Court allowed, was arbitrary but necessary under
the circumstances. “It is difficult even for expert
psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile
offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet
transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender
whose crime reflects irreparable corruption,” he wrote.
In Graham v Florida (2009), the Court extended this
reasoning to another set of juvenile offenders, those
facing life without parole for crimes other than
homicide. The decision, like the one in Roper, was
categorical, applying to all individuals below the age
of 18 at the time the crime was committed. Again,
the Court explained, “even if we were to assume
that some juvenile nonhomicide offenders…merit a
life without parole sentence, it does not follow that
courts taking a case-by-case proportionality approach
could with sufficient accuracy distinguish the few
incorrigible juvenile offenders from the many that
have the capacity for change.”
Finally, in Miller v. Alabama (2013), the Court
concluded that the Eighth Amendment also prohibits
mandatory life without parole for juveniles convicted
of homicide. Citing both Roper and Graham, once
again the Court’s decision referenced scientific
findings that “both lessened a child’s ‘moral culpability’
and enhanced the prospect that, as the years go by
and neurological development occurs, his ‘deficiencies
will be reformed.’” It also reiterated the previously
noted difficulty of distinguishing between “transient
immaturity” and “irreparable corruption.”
Yet in Miller, the Court declined to “foreclose a
sentencer’s ability” to make that distinction. That
is, unlike Roper and Graham, Miller gave courts the

option of sentencing youthful offenders to life without
parole on a case-by-case basis, despite the fact that
there is no available neuroscience research to aid
such a determination. There is no neural signature
for maturity, no single psychological test that directly
reveals how well developed an individual person is.
Justice Kagan, writing for the Miller Court, did note the
incongruity between the earlier cases of Roper and
Graham and the one before her. She believed that the
scientific studies regarding the average maturity of
adolescents might create something of a presumption
against Life Without Parole sentences for youthful
offenders. As she put it, “appropriate occasions for
sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty
will be uncommon.”
Do the inherent challenges of G2i, then, constitute an
unbridgeable gulf between science and the law? We
think not. Although G2i decsribes a fundamental divide
between the two disciplines, and perhaps no single
structure is available to bridge it—at least, not yet—it’s
a division that might be managed effectively.
Effective management will depend both on paying
attention to the specific legal context and on the
science that might be available at the time in each
of those contexts. Consider, for example, the issue
raised by the Miller case. The Court found that
the state of the science indicated legally relevant
differences in maturity between adolescents
and adults, which supported its ruling that it was
unconstitutional to sentence adolescent homicide
offenders to mandatory life in prison. The science
on adolescents as a group thus helped establish
the constitutional rule. But, as a practical matter,
courts must now sentence individual adolescents.
Almost certainly, at sentencing the parties will seek
to introduce “scientific” expert testimony that
supports their side—for the defendant, that he was
developmentally immature at the time of the crime
and, for the prosecution, that the defendant was as
developmentally mature as an average adult when he
committed the crime.
Should courts admit this form of diagnostic expert
evidence? The answer rests on a G2i evaluation
and, specifically, whether the scientific foundation
is sound enough to permit a valid opinion about the
individual case. If the answer is no, other evidence,
evidence from non-experts (i.e., family, friends, police,
victims, etc.) can still be introduced to demonstrate
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the defendant’s level of developmental maturity at the
time of the crime. Just as in the case of eyewitness
identification research, the general framework
research on adolescent behavioral and brain
development is valuable and admissible. Whether a
particular individual is or is not mature continues to be
a pivotal legal issue, but may not be one that science
can answer with any certainty.

MANAGING THE G2i DIVIDE
Managing G2i requires, foremost, the active
involvement of both legal scholars and scientists.
For the courts, adopting just two key best practices
will help reduce the complexity that contemporary
science has added to the already complex adjudicative
task. First, courts must begin their consideration of
scientific evidence by focusing on both whether it is
“good”—that is, meets certain evidentiary standards—
and on what it’s good for. Every case involving expert
evidence involves a choice: admit testimony about
the general phenomenon, or admit such general
testimony and diagnostic testimony. The first decision
is separate from the second. Furthermore, diagnostic
testimony cannot be admissible unless the testimony
on the general phenomenon is also admissible;
evidence that something is an instance of a larger
phenomenon presumes that the larger phenomenon
itself exists.
Second, only after the court has decided whether
the expert testimony concerns a general phenomenon,
or concerns whether a particular case is an instance
of that phenomenon, should it determine whether
that testimony is admissible. While few courts
realize it, the primary criteria derived from Daubert—
i.e., relevance, qualifications, scientific validity, added
value or helpfulness, and unfair prejudice—operate
differently depending on how the evidence is to
be used.

For scientists, and the experts who testify to the
science, a host of issues should be paramount. The
process of reasoning from group data to individual
cases, of course, is principally a scientific one and,
more particularly, a matter of statistical inference.
The scientific community might begin by asking
which methods or tools might be available or could
be developed to facilitate the process. The issue
of G2i reasoning is not unique to the courtroom.
Meteorologists study storms, but we want to
know whether a storm will hit during our commute
tomorrow morning. Medical researchers study the
effectiveness of drugs, but we want to know whether
a particular drug will relieve our headache or, possibly,
cause some side effects. Ordinarily, the G2i issue
is translated into group statistical terms: “there’s
a 60 percent chance it will be raining at 8:30 a.m.
tomorrow.” In court, decision makers often need to
translate those probabilities into more categorical
terms, such as guilty/not guilty, liable/not liable,
mature/not mature, and causation/no causation.
Scientists could assist the process considerably
by helping courts understand and translate the
probabilities derived from group data to help legal
decision makers decide individual cases.
Scientific advances in understanding the challenges of
G2i, however, might not be far off. For instance, we
may be on the cusp of an explosion of high-quality
“precision” science in realms from neuroscience to
genetics to nanotechnology. One tantalizing promise
of science in the 21st century is knowledge at the
level of the individual, and the challenge for courts
in the 21st century is to distinguish between that
promise and reality. Developing and refining a more
sophisticated understanding of science, along with
evidentiary guidelines that reflect that understanding,
will enable the courts to meet that challenge now and
in the decades to come.

To learn more
For a full discussion of the material presented in this summary, including how evidentiary standards change depending whether
an expert is offering framework or diagnostic testimony, see Group to Individual (G2i) Inference in Scientific Expert Testimony,
David L. Faigman, John Monahan, & Christopher Slobogin, 81(2) U. Chi. L. Rev. 417 (2014).
For an example of how the best practices described in the above article might apply to a specific discipline, see Toward a
Jurisprudence of Psychiatric Evidence: Examining the Challenges of Reasoning from Group Data in Psychiatry to Individual
Decisions in the Law, Carl E. Fisher, David L. Faigman, & Paul S. Appelbaum, 69(3) U. Miami L. Rev. (2015).
Law & Neuroscience: What, Why, and Where to Begin, MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Law and Neuroscience (2016).
For more information about the work of the MacArthur Foundation Law and Neuroscience Network, visit www.lawneuro.org.

The MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Law and Neuroscience / G2i Knowledge Brief / June 2017

4

